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THE LOOMING BATTLE FOR  
CONTROL OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION  
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Andrew D. Bradt* 
INTRODUCTION 
2018 marks fifty years since the passage of the Multidistrict Litigation Act.  
But instead of thoughts of a golden-anniversary celebration, an old Rodney 
Dangerfield one-liner comes to mind:  “[M]y last birthday cake looked like 
a prairie fire.”1  Indeed, after a long period of relative obscurity, multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) has become a subject of major controversy—and not only 
among scholars of procedure.2  For a long time, both within and beyond the 
rarified world of procedure scholars, MDL was perceived as the more 
technical, less extreme cousin of the class action, which attracted most of the 
controversy.3 
But as class actions have receded, at least in mass-tort cases, MDL has 
stepped into the spotlight.4  The attention is in part due to sheer numbers—
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Susannah Tobin.  This Article was prepared for the Fordham Law Review Symposium entitled 
Civil Litigation Reform in the Trump Era:  Threats and Opportunities, held at Fordham 
University School of Law on February 23, 2018. 
 
 1. Tom Shales, Rodney Dangerfield Gets Respect, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 1979), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1979/08/28/rodney-dangerfield-gets-
respect/ecaf3fc9-4299-49f8-b008-91409be7ca94/ [https://perma.cc/99U6-YSPG]. 
 2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 71, 73 (2015) (describing the importance of steering committees); Howard M. Erichson, 
Beyond the Class Action:  Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective 
Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 541. 
 3. Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 47 
(1991) (describing MDL as a “‘sleeper’—having enormous effect on the world of 
contemporary litigation but attracting relatively few critical comments”); see also Margaret S. 
Thomas, Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 
1339, 1350 (2014) (noting that “MDL . . . remains one of the least studied types of federal 
litigation”). 
 4. Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations:  Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793–
94 (2010); see also Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate 
Litigation:  A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296 (2014) (describing U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence limiting availability of class actions). 
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39 percent of the pending federal civil docket is in MDL.5  But it is also 
because MDL is now the arena in which many issues of major public concern 
are playing out6—and typically being settled.7  Examples include the 
Volkswagen clean diesel scandal,8 the National Football League concussion 
litigation,9 the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,10 and, now, the opioid-addiction 
crisis, which has thrust MDL into the public consciousness.11  Due to both 
the scope of the opioid epidemic and the aggressive posture of the judge in 
charge, explanations of what MDL is, how it works, and what it does have 
now made their way into the pages of major newspapers and onto the screens 
of major websites.  This shift is an odd development for those of us who once 
struggled to explain concepts like the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (JPML) and limited transfer for pretrial proceedings to our 
nonproceduralist colleagues and now find ourselves discussing these topics 
with reporters.12 
Even before opioids, MDL’s dominance had begun to garner plaudits—
indeed, as Professor Coffee puts it, “the most successful step taken in the 
administration of aggregate litigation in the United States was the creation of 
the JPML in 1968.”13  But with this success has come scrutiny; as MDL has 
grown ever more prominent, it has also attracted the attention of not just 
scholars, but lawmakers.  Today’s MDL framework is effectively the same 
as when it was enacted by Congress in 1968,14 but that may not be the case 
 
 5. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure:  Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s 
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2017) 
(noting that this is “a number that tends to shock even those law professors who teach 
procedure”). 
 6. Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Samuel Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 850 (2017) (noting the “stunning growth” in MDL, especially in high-
profile cases). 
 7. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL 
L. REV. 265, 270 (2011) (describing MDL’s facility in coordinating global settlement). 
 8. See generally Wyoming v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc. (In re Volkswagen Clean 
Diesel Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.), 264 F. Supp. 3d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 9. See generally In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d, 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 10. See generally In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” on April 20, 2010, 
21 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. La. 2014); Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil 
Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397 (2014). 
 11. See generally In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 
2017). 
 12. See, e.g., Christa Case Bryant & Henry Gass, An Unprecedented Effort to Stem Opioid 
Crisis—and the Judge Behind It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0509/An-unprecedented-effort-to-stem-
opioid-crisis-and-the-judge-behind-it [https://perma.cc/X3EQ-YKU5]; Abbe R. Gluck, 
Opinion, Can a Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2018, 6:24 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-a-judge-solve-the-opioid-crisis-1525731873 
[https://perma.cc/S7CX-7QEY]. 
 13. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION:  ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE 155 
(2015). 
 14. 90 CONG. REC. 4927–28 (1968) (noting the passage of the bill on the consent 
calendar). 
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forever.15  Last year, the House introduced a bill backed exclusively by 
Republicans, the Fairness in Class Actions Litigation Act (FICALA), which 
included a lengthy set of new provisions to “reform” multidistrict litigation.16  
The bill was passed on party lines in the House—without hearings—and 
currently languishes in the Senate.17  But the extensive MDL provisions in 
the bill demonstrate that the interests of corporate defendants hew toward 
significant changes to MDL procedure, which they believe is currently rife 
with abuse by plaintiffs and overreach by imperialistic judges.18  Although 
current prospects for FICALA’s passage are uncertain in the Senate,19 those 
behind the legislation are also now pursuing reform through a different 
avenue:  the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (“Rules Committee”).  In 
late 2017, numerous proposals, many of which are similar or identical to 
those in FICALA, were presented for consideration to the Rules Committee, 
which caused the chair to appoint a subcommittee to investigate whether 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for MDL should be considered.20  This 
would be a striking change as these rules would be the first ever directed to 
MDL. 
MDLs have always been thought to be adequately governed by the plain 
old Federal Rules.  Indeed, in what today seems like a redundancy, the MDL 
statute provides that the JPML may not create rules for MDL that are 
inconsistent with the Federal Rules.21  Currently, however, proponents of 
FICALA and the Federal Rules for MDL, most notably the advocacy group 
Lawyers for Civil Justice,22 take the position that the typical rules are 
inadequate.  Rather, they perceive MDL judges as effectively unbound by 
procedural doctrine—operating in something like the Outback Steakhouse of 
litigation:  “No Rules, Just Right.”  In their view, these judges see themselves 
as “cowboys” with a roving commission to resolve and settle major national 
crises by whatever means necessary, often making it up as they go along.23  
Once an MDL gets going, they believe judges use the effectively limitless 
 
 15. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Stickiness of Multidistrict Litigation, 37 REV. LITIG. 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 18–20) (on file with author). 
 16. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017); Press Release, Rep. Goodlatte, Goodlatte 
Introduces Major Litigation Reform Bill to Improve Access to Justice for American 
Consumers (Feb. 10, 2017), http://goodlatte.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? 
DocumentID=809 [https://perma.cc/WPA7-FQP7]. 
 17. Perry Cooper, Bill Targeting Class Actions, MDLs Sent to House, BLOOMBERG BNA 
(Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/bill-targeting-class-n57982083903/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3FGD-S66R] (noting that an “earlier version” of the bill “stalled in the Senate”). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 115-25, at 3 (2017). 
 19. Richard Marcus, Revolution v. Evolution in Class Action Reform, 96 N.C. L. REV. 903, 
939 (2018) (“It is uncertain whether this proposed legislation will ultimately be adopted.”). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (2012). 
 22. Lawyers for Civil Justice describes itself as “a partnership of leading corporate 
counsel and defense bar practitioners . . . .  [Which] unit[es] the business and defense bar 
communities in propelling reasonable reform initiatives.” See About Us, LAWYERS FOR CIVIL 
JUSTICE, http://www.lfcj.com/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/Y9NF-YWC9] (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2018). 
 23. Gluck, supra note 12. 
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power at their disposal to broker a global settlement.24  In their view, this 
unbalanced procedure results in plaintiffs bringing meritless MDL claims 
and forces defendants into settlements to make them go away and satisfy the 
judge.25  Determining whether any of this is true demands rigorous empirical 
analysis—analysis one hopes will be undertaken dispassionately before any 
changes are made. 
In the meantime though, it is worth remembering what Professor Burbank 
taught long ago:  procedure is about power, when it comes both to who writes 
the rules and what they say.26  And the fight over MDL, both past and present, 
is a striking example of this battle for power. 
My goal in this Article is to situate the looming battle for control over 
MDL within its historical context.  MDL was, from the beginning, a power 
grab, albeit a well-intentioned one, by judges who believed that concentrated 
national judicial power was necessary to meet the demands of a coming 
“litigation explosion” in the federal courts.27  These judges thought that 
control over managing these cases needed to be taken out of the hands of 
both individual litigants,28 particularly well-resourced corporate defendants 
who benefited from delays, backlogs, and complexity,29 and passive judges 
inclined to allow the parties to decide the pace of their cases.30  They believed 
what was urgently necessary was a statute that gave judges control over 
nationwide litigation and enabled them to aggressively move cases to a 
conclusion, thereby preventing the federal courts from breaking down under 
the coming wave of litigation and ensuring that the law would be enforced.31 
Although initial proposals for the MDL statute envisioned Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for MDL cases, the judges who supported the initiative 
came to believe that participation by rule makers would unduly delay 
implementation of the statute and that rigid rules would interfere with the 
flexibility necessary to manage the coming deluge of complex cases.32  They 
also recognized that the corporate-defense bar, which had effectively blocked 
the statute’s passage in Congress in 1966, opposed MDL because its 
effectiveness at enforcing the substantive law would work to the detriment 
of their clients who benefited from delays and resource advantages.33  
Accordingly, the MDL statute was intentionally designed to avoid 
 
 24. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, REQUEST FOR RULE MAKING TO THE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 3 (2017), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061707/ 
lcj_request_for_rulemaking_concerning_mdl_cases_8-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P5U-
NQWR]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 513 (1996). 
 27. Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”:  The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 907 n.528 (2017). 
 28. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 24, at 3. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Bradt, supra note 27, at 841–42. 
 31. Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More:  MDL’s Roots as a Class 
Action Alternative, 165 U. PA. L. REV 1711, 1713 (2017). 
 32. Id. at 1732–33. 
 33. Id. 
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rulemaking and to ignore the objections of the defense bar.  The locus of 
control of MDL would be the newly created JPML with the transferee judges 
handpicked to manage the consolidated pretrial proceedings.34 
Part of what makes the current legislative proposals—which are almost 
entirely driven by the corporate-defense bar—interesting is that they threaten 
this central, and very intentional, locus of control.  Externally imposed 
procedures for MDL cases, whether mandated by Congress or the Rules 
Committee, would undermine one of the crucial goals of the drafters of the 
statute, who believed that flexibility for individual judges was necessary to 
adapt to the endless variety of complicated cases that face the federal 
courts.35  Instead of a one-size-fits-all structure, judges wanted to manage 
litigation on a case-by-case basis to demonstrate that the federal courts could 
in fact handle the coming wave of litigation, and thereby enforce the laws 
they had been charged with effectuating.  Rather than rules imposed by other 
parties, the judges who created MDL wanted independence for the JPML and 
transferee judges—independence that could be guided by the suggestions 
described in the original Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 
which was primarily drafted by Judge William Becker of Kansas City, the 
same judge who spearheaded the effort to create the MDL statute.36  The 
Manual, like other judicial guides to handling complex cases before it, was 
intended to provide a nonbinding set of suggestions judges might consider 
when presented with multidistrict cases.37  It was to be the Manual that would 
guide MDL practice—not strict procedures imposed from without.38  Today, 
the drive to create MDL “rules” threatens these basic features of the MDL 
framework, and the battle lines look just like they did in the 1960s. 
My goal in this Article is not to argue that this history binds either the 
Rules Committee under the Rules Enabling Act or Congress, which is 
ultimately in charge of federal procedure.39  Nor is it to defend the practices 
of the judges who used their influence to push the MDL statute over the 
congressional finish line in 1968.  Instead, my intent is to shed light on the 
reasons the statute was constructed as it was and suggest that those engaged 
in the current debate ask, after becoming informed by available data, whether 
those reasons have lost any of their currency.  I also offer some tenuous 
predictions about the path forward, recognizing that the prediction business 
 
 34. See generally Bradt, supra note 15. 
 35. See infra Part I. 
 36. See In Memoriam:  Judge William H. Becker, 807 F. Supp. LXIX, LXXII (W.D. Mo. 
1992) (“[I]t was Judge Becker’s pen that really was reflected in the first draft of the manual.”); 
see also Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the 
Merits:  Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 294 
n.26 (2013) (“The motor force behind the drafting of the Manual was the leadership of William 
H. Becker.”). 
 37. Bradt, supra note 27, at 853. 
 38. See Pub. L. No. 90-296, 92 Stat. 1407 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1407 (2012)) (granting wide discretion to transferee judges in MDLs). 
 39. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power:  The Role of Congress, 
79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1678 (2004) (noting that Congress “holds the cards” when it 
comes to federal procedure). 
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is a dangerous one in the current political climate.  First, I review the history 
to explain why the MDL framework was built without Rules Committee 
involvement.  Then, I fast-forward to the present day and discuss briefly the 
nascent proposals to either amend the MDL statute or provide for Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure for MDL.  Finally, I conclude by assessing the 
current debate and make some suggestions as this debate winds its way 
forward.  In 1968, the small cadre of judges who developed and fought for 
the MDL statute won the battle for procedural power.  Today, fifty years 
later, the MDL statute continues to operate as they imagined.  However, with 
success comes scrutiny, and what had been settled is now once again up for 
debate. 
I.  CONTROL OVER MDL:  THE 1960S STORY 
The MDL statute was passed without a single dissenting vote in 1968—
but that fact risks obscuring the real story.  The MDL statute was enormously 
controversial, both among federal judges and the practicing bar, particularly 
the corporate-defense bar.40  That it became law at all was due largely to the 
maneuvering and lobbying of a small group of federal judges, led by Circuit 
Judge Alfred Murrah and District Judge William Becker.41  In addition, the 
efforts of Maryland Senator Joseph Tydings, who chaired the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, were critical.42  I have outlined the story of the MDL 
statute in detail elsewhere.43  Here, I focus on aspects of that story relevant 
to our subject—where control over MDL rests. 
The MDL statute arose out of the massive and unprecedented litigation 
that followed revelations of price-fixing in the electrical-equipment industry 
in the 1950s.44  A deluge of civil litigation began across the country, and in 
1962 Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed a committee of federal judges, the 
Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation (CCML), to consider ways 
of streamlining the litigation to avoid grinding the business of the federal 
courts to a halt.45  Warren did not choose the judges on the committee 
randomly; they were selected because they were longtime proponents of 
then-novel principles of case management in complex litigation.46  The 
dominant norm in federal judging had been a hands-off approach—these 
judges, and in particular Judge Murrah, were men who believed that judges 
needed to take rigid control of cases, actively manage discovery and motion 
practice, and even promote settlement.47  Given the massive influx of 
 
 40. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 838–40. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 854–63. 
 45. Id. at 855–56. 
 46. Id. at 851–59. 
 47. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16:  A Look at the Theory and Practice of 
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1983 (1989) (describing the “major development” of 
the 1950s when judges began to “see themselves . . . more as managers of a costly and 
complicated process”). 
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electrical-equipment antitrust cases, some 1900 of them, each of which 
would have been a complicated “big case” individually, Chief Justice Warren 
believed nationwide managerial innovation was necessary and that these 
were the judges to develop it.48 
The CCML began an aggressive campaign of organized discovery, pretrial 
conferences, and uniform orders.49  But the Committee had no statutory 
mandate.  Instead, it relied on the cooperation of all of the judges to whom 
the cases had been assigned around the country to stick with the program.  
Happily, due in large part to the magnitude of the electrical-equipment 
litigation crisis, the program was successful on its terms, and the cases were 
almost entirely resolved by 1966.50  It was during this period that the CCML, 
with the support of Chief Justice Warren and the Judicial Conference, turned 
toward creating a permanent statutory mechanism for coordinating related 
cases filed in multiple districts.51  These judges believed that such cases of 
nationwide import would become increasingly common as technology and 
communications brought the country together, the population grew, and new 
causes of action proliferated.52  The electrical-equipment cases were just the 
tip of the iceberg.53 
Coordinating cases in a single district for pretrial proceedings followed by 
remand for trial was the brainchild of the Secretary for the CCML, Professor 
Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago Law School.54  This idea of 
“limited transfer” was the hallmark of the MDL statute from the beginning.55  
But in its initial phases, the plan was for the MDL statute to enable the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to develop Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to determine when an MDL should be created, where it should be 
assigned, and what rules should govern it after transfer.  Indeed, this was the 
plan as late June 1964.56  As Judge Becker described the draft statute to his 
colleagues on the CCML, “‘the rule making power [should] be employed to 
the maximum’ [to] ‘allow greater flexibility for amendment and supplement 
of the procedures.’”57 
But in this respect the CCML changed course soon thereafter.  The judges 
decided that, instead of delegating power to the Rules Committee, the power 
to decide whether to create an MDL should be lodged in a new and 
independent committee of judges, the JPML, and they abandoned entirely the 
idea that there should be special rules of procedure for MDL cases.58  Why 
the change in course?  First, the CCML had observed the difficult and 
 
 48. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 854–56. 
 49. Id. at 856–58. 
 50. Id. at 859–60. 
 51. Id. at 863–64. 
 52. Id. at 889–90. 
 53. See id. at 863–66. 
 54. Id. at 864–65. 
 55. Id. at 839. 
 56. Id. at 871–72. 
 57. Id. at 870.  The underlying archival research is discussed in-depth in my Article. See 
generally id. 
 58. Id. at 881. 
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protracted fight in the Rules Committee over the amended joinder rules, 
including new Rule 23.59  The CCML, fearing an imminent litigation 
explosion, did not want to wait out a lengthy Rules Committee process before 
getting MDL started, particularly if such a process would work a change in 
their vision.60  Second, and relatedly, to avoid the Rules Committee’s 
involvement in an area it likely considered its jurisdiction, Judge Becker 
would have to take the MDL proposal “straight to the top” of the Judicial 
Conference to secure its support for the MDL statute in Congress.61  To do 
so, Becker and Murrah would have to get the blessing of Chief Judge Alfred 
Maris of the Third Circuit, who was the powerful chairman of the Committee 
on Revision of the Laws and whose support was necessary to influence the 
congressional judiciary committees.62  Judge Maris, helpfully it turned out, 
generally supported the MDL idea of limited transfer for pretrial 
proceedings, but he was deeply skeptical of the idea of Federal Rules for the 
conduct of MDL.63  Maris believed that these cases would come in all shapes 
and sizes and was leery of any rules that assumed all cases should all be 
conducted in a particular way.64 
By late 1965, the CCML concurred with Maris and adopted his insight on 
the importance of case-by-case flexibility.  Moreover, they all agreed that 
there need not be Rules Committee involvement—both to avoid 
entanglements and delays, but also to avoid retarding innovation in 
overseeing complex cases of nationwide importance.65  The decision was 
thus made to cut the rule makers out of the process entirely and instead lodge 
power over MDL in the new JPML, which would autonomously decide 
whether and where to establish MDLs, create rules for its own conduct, and 
be almost entirely insulated from appellate review.66  Maris agreed with this 
course of action and endorsed the revised MDL statute in the Judicial 
Conference, which agreed to support the statute in Congress.67 
Judicial Conference support was a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the MDL statute’s enactment.68  The Judicial Conference had significant 
influence in Congress in the 1960s, but such influence was not enough on its 
own in the face of other obstacles, namely the opposition of the corporate-
defense bar led by particularly powerful New York antitrust lawyers who 
believed that they had been steamrolled into settlement in the electrical-
 
 59. Bradt, supra note 15 (manuscript at 2). 
 60. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 873 (“Becker thought it important that the group sidestep 
the lengthy process of presenting its draft for revisions by the Civil Rules Committee, which 
could take years and would also leave their statute vulnerable to revision by other judges.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. at 879–80. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 878–82. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at 881–83. 
 68. See PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 301–
06 (1973) (describing the power of the Judicial Conference in Congress in the 1960s). 
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equipment cases.69  In language that would seem quite familiar today, those 
lawyers complained bitterly that the focus on speed and resolution in the 
electrical cases effectively railroaded them into paying out meritless claims.  
As Breck McAllister of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine, put it, “it 
became very clear that . . . the national program of the Committee would 
move forward and ‘nothing’ would interfere with its progress.”70  Lawyer 
John Logan O’Donnell added that the speed of discovery eliminated 
defendants’ ability “to point out and question specific characteristics of the 
cases.”71  And, as lawyer Miles G. Seeley later summarized, defense counsel 
believed that “they and their clients were caught up in a torrent of judicial 
efficiency over whose tumult they scarcely could make their voices heard.”72 
Moreover, those lawyers understood well that aggregation of plaintiffs’ 
claims would eliminate one of their most potent litigation advantages:  the 
imbalance of resources.  By allowing plaintiffs to pool resources and 
coordinate activities, the MDL statute would level the playing field.  As 
O’Donnell put it bluntly, the aggregation eliminated defendants’ “advantage 
of numbers” because “[p]laintiffs pool their resources and generally 
designate their most experienced lawyers.”73  He continued, “more 
important, each plaintiff is handed a ready-made case to the extent that expert 
lead counsel can establish it and, in any event, a far better case than most 
plaintiffs’ counsel could ever establish without the coordinated program.”74 
For their part, the judges of the CCML, particularly Becker, Murrah, and 
Judge Edwin Robson of Chicago, believed that defense counsel were mostly 
interested in preserving this resource advantage and, in Robson’s words, 
were “trying to do all they c[ould] to block this amendment.”75  Indeed, the 
CCML set a meeting with some defense counsel in the electrical cases to 
solicit input on the proposed MDL statute.  When the lawyers suggested 
circulating the provision to a wide group of lawyers for public comment, the 
CCML bristled, believing that the lawyers merely sought to delay and 
frustrate passage of the statute, or at least dominate the drafting process.76  
As Robson wrote to Becker, “It is apparent that defendants wish to kick the 
ball around.”77  Becker’s skepticism was equally strong: 
Underlying the action of some of the defendants’ counsel throughout this 
litigation must have been the hope that this electrical equipment antitrust 
litigation would overwhelm the Courts and demonstrate the unworkability 
of the antitrust laws allowing treble damage recoveries in civil suits.  Every 
 
 69. See Bradt, supra note 27, at 888. 
 70. Breck P. McAllister, Judicial Administration of Multiple-District Treble Damage 
Administration, in 1966 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 55, 60 (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n ed., 1966). 
 71. John Logan O’Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the 
Defendants’ Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 137 (1966). 
 72. Miles G. Seeley, Procedures for Coordinated Multi-District Litigation:  A Nineteenth 
Century Mind Views with Alarm, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91, 93 (1969). 
 73. O’Donnell, supra note 71, at 138–39. 
 74. Id. at 139. 
 75. Bradt, supra note 27, at 876. 
 76. Id. at 876. 
 77. Id. 
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measure proposed which would make multiple civil antitrust litigation 
manageable, impairs that hope.78 
Ultimately, the judges pushing the MDL statute concluded that defense 
counsel were little more than rent seekers, out to preserve their advantages in 
costs and delays while also undermining the courts as a vehicle for private 
enforcement of the substantive law.  The result was that the judges abandoned 
their attempt to receive feedback from defense counsel and pressed ahead 
without their support.79 
This was a disastrous legislative strategy.  The defense lawyers that the 
CCML had rebuffed controlled the powerful antitrust section of the 
American Bar Association (ABA).  Those lawyers generated a resolution 
from both the antitrust section and then the entire House of Delegates of the 
ABA at its annual meeting in 1966 and did so without notice to either the 
plaintiff-side members of the antitrust section or the judges supporting the 
MDL bill.80  As Judge Robson accurately described things, “the cards were 
stacked against us by the defendants.”81  Without ABA support, and with the 
opposition of powerful New York attorneys connected to House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman Emmanuel Celler, the MDL bill was stuck—and it 
would remain so until the ABA dropped its opposition.82  Even in the Senate, 
where the MDL bill was getting traction—thanks largely to the interest of 
Senator Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who was especially interested in 
efficient judicial administration—prominent members of the corporate-
defense bar railed against the bill.  They offered amendments, such as a 
predominance requirement, that Becker believed were intended to cripple the 
effectiveness of the statute.83  Becker successfully beat back those 
amendments in the Senate, but the ABA resolution continued to block the 
bill in the House until early 1968.84 
What broke the logjam?  Face-to-face politics.  A corollary to the CCML’s 
eventual view that there need not be Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for 
MDL was the idea that innovation in complex litigation would be better 
developed through a set of nonbinding guidelines in a handbook that would 
be open to revision.85  This project, led by Becker, was to be titled Manual 
for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation and was already underway when the 
MDL statute was stalled (proceeding without input from the defense bar).86  
As Professor Miller remembers, corporate defense counsel “were fighting the 
manual as it was then drafted tooth and nail” because it appeared to facilitate 
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the kind of benefits for plaintiffs that the defendants had complained of in 
the electrical-equipment cases.87 
In 1967, a meeting was held in New York between the judges supporting 
the MDL statute and the prominent defense lawyers opposing it.88  At that 
meeting, the CCML judges emphasized their need for the lawyers’ support 
of the MDL statute.89  Shortly after, the lawyers changed course and 
facilitated the ABA’s dropping of its opposition.90  But something else 
happened:  the defense bar got a seat at the table for the drafting of the 
Manual—a story I tell in some detail elsewhere.91  Having reviewed the 
available historical record, my hypothesis is that the lawyers, rational actors 
and repeat players in the federal courts, saw this as a worthwhile exchange 
and dropped their opposition to the statute in exchange for influence on the 
Manual.  And they exercised that influence, by suggesting an array of 
changes that found their way into the finished project.92 
Moreover, once the opposition was dropped, the dam broke—the MDL 
statute was passed in remarkably short order and was signed by President 
Johnson on April 29, 1968.93  Chief Justice Warren appointed the first JPML, 
and MDL was off and running.94 
II.  CONTROL OVER MDL:  THE 2018 STORY 
Over the intervening five decades, MDL has hummed along with virtually 
no legislative or Supreme Court intervention.95  So it came as something of 
a surprise when FICALA was proposed in the House in 2017.  The surprise 
was not that the bill was introduced—that had happened before.  But it had, 
as its title suggests, historically focused on class actions.  But this time, the 
bill contained an entirely new set of provisions devoted to amending the 
MDL statute, including provisions that imposed rigid procedural rules and 
threatened the independence of the MDL transferee judge that was so 
important to the drafters of the statute.96  For instance, the statute includes:  
(1) a requirement of evidentiary verification of allegations within forty-five 
days of filing or transfer; (2) a bar on bellwether trials without consent; 
(3) enhanced interlocutory review of most orders issued by the MDL judge; 
and (4) a requirement that personal-injury plaintiffs receive “not less than 80 
percent of any monetary recovery.”97  The accompanying report from the 
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House Judiciary Committee makes plain the purposes of these provisions, in 
language that could have come from MDL’s opponents in the mid-1960s 
(except for the concern trolling on behalf of plaintiffs):  “The resulting 
massive proceedings, often largely consisting of claims that should never 
have been filed, impose unfair burdens on courts and defendants and prevent 
plaintiffs with trial-worthy claims from timely getting their day in court.”98  
FICALA passed the house on a party-line vote with no amendments and no 
hearings.99  As of this writing, the bill remains in the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.100 
Perhaps only mildly daunted, the proponents of these measures have 
opened up a new front for reform:  the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules.  
Three groups made proposals to the Rules Committee for its November 2017 
meeting:  Lawyers for Civil Justice, Washington Legal Foundation, and the 
Duke Center for Judicial Studies represented by John Rabiej.101  The 
proposals contain different provisions, but they share two of FICALA’s 
foundational principles:  that MDL judges need to be constrained, and that 
MDL attracts meritless claims that are underexamined before being folded 
into a global settlement.  Also like FICALA, the proposals share enthusiasm 
for requiring early factual support for plaintiffs’ claims, consent for 
bellwether trials, and increased interlocutory appeal.  But some of the 
proposals go further and target other aspects of MDL procedure, such as the 
use of master complaints and internal governance of plaintiff steering 
committees.102  As articulated in the agenda book for the November meeting, 
“the question is whether the time has come to undertake an effort to generate 
rules specially adapted to MDL proceedings.”103  The Rules Committee 
concluded that a subcommittee should be appointed to 
gather more information.  Valuable information has been provided, but it is 
mostly from one perspective . . . .  But the Committee needs more, 
particularly from the Judicial Panel [on Multidistrict Litigation].  The 
Committee should launch a six- to twelve-month project to gather 
information that will support a decision whether to embark on generating 
new rules.  A Subcommittee will be appointed to develop this 
information.104 
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This Subcommittee issued a report for the April 10, 2018, meeting of the 
Rules Committee, though it emphasized that “it has reached no conclusions 
about whether any rule changes should be seriously considered, much less 
which ones.  The range of issues is very broad, and forming a sufficient 
information base for serious consideration of rule amendments . . . will be 
challenging.”105  Thus far, the plaintiffs’ bar, at least as preliminarily 
represented by the American Association for Justice, has expressed “deep 
reservations” about any MDL rules, largely on the ground that “MDLs are so 
case-specific that ‘one size fits all’ rules do not make sense.  Judges need to 
remain empowered to exercise broad discretion in any particular case rather 
than be constrained by formalistic preconceptions of what a vocal minority 
consider to be ‘best practices.’”106  For its part, the JPML apparently has 
reported to the Subcommittee “skepticism about whether rule changes would 
materially improve MDL practice.”107  It has further reported that “[p]anel 
members are open to work on shared concerns, but may be inclined to think 
that distinctive aspects of different MDLs make some overarching set of new 
rules hard to imagine.”108  At least at these early stages, the battle lines are 
drawn; well-funded corporate defense groups in favor of rules want to limit 
discretion of MDL judges, while the plaintiffs’ bar and JPML are copacetic 
with the status quo. 
III.  LOOKING AHEAD, WHILE ALSO LOOKING BACK 
Whether any of these efforts will be successful is impossible to know at 
this early stage.  The legislative effort appears stalled in the Senate, and the 
results of the November 2018 midterm elections may press the pause button 
for the foreseeable future.  On the rulemaking side, the Subcommittee will 
be embarking on a lengthy period of study and reaching out to concerned 
parties and collecting data, as it of course should.  And if past is prologue, 
changes coming through the rulemaking process are likely to be relatively 
modest and mirror changes in class actions that were, in Richard Marcus’s 
apt terms, “evolutionary” rather than “revolutionary.”109  But even 
evolutionary changes can be significant and important.  Consider, for 
instance, the effects of the interlocutory appeal provision for class 
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certification in Rule 23(f).110  Similarly, any of the current MDL proposals 
in FICALA could work a major change in the dynamics of MDL practice.111 
Nevertheless, as Professors Burbank and Farhang have taught us, major 
change through legislation is extraordinarily difficult and through modern 
rulemaking only somewhat less so. The status quo is “sticky,” particularly 
when codified by a statute or rule.112  As a structural matter, “the institutional 
hurdles were simply too high” for conservatives to eliminate the legislation- 
and rule-based infrastructure of the twentieth-century procedural system.113  
As a result, procedural retrenchment was achieved through decisions made 
by an increasingly polarized and conservative Supreme Court, not 
legislation.114  And, as I have written elsewhere, the drafters of the MDL 
statute designed it to be especially sticky by vesting power and maximal 
discretion in the hands of the JPML and its preferred transferee judges.115  
That MDL has eluded significant interference for the last fifty years is a 
testament to stickiness generally and the deftness with which Becker and his 
allies designed their creation.  Indeed, what they saw to fruition in 1968 was 
built to last.  The creators of the MDL statute were not modest about their 
work—at the time, they saw it as a “radical proposal,” one which would 
become a centerpiece of a federal procedural system which would come to 
be dominated by large-scale, nationwide, and, indeed, mass-tort litigation.  
That MDL has been such a success, warts and all, demonstrates amply their 
prescience.116 
Increasing the odds against a new suite of federal rules for MDL is the fact 
that, as a practical matter, it would be an extraordinarily complicated 
endeavor.  Simply collecting the necessary reliable data on MDL is a difficult 
and resource-intensive task.117  And although the current momentum for 
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rulemaking comes primarily from defense interests, opening the door to this 
debate will inevitably introduce criticism of how MDL works from other 
perspectives, including the plaintiffs’.  Such criticism may not come from 
prominent members of the MDL plaintiffs’ bar, which tends more often than 
not to be the subject of this criticism rather than the source, but from 
academics who argue that powerful repeat-player plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
part of the problem and not the solution.118  Ultimately, then, having loosened 
the lid on Pandora’s Box by studying the possibility of rulemaking for MDL, 
this may be the sort of project that the rule makers might shy away from 
simply as a matter of prudence.119  Indeed, one of the main reasons why 
Judge Murrah and Judge Becker, at Judge Maris’s encouragement, backed 
away from rulemaking for MDL in the 1960s was the potential difficulty and 
time-consuming nature of the project.120  If nothing else, the repeated 
attempts to revise the class action rules, attempts that have resulted in 
relatively marginal changes, have demonstrated the difficulty of making 
massive changes through the rulemaking process.121  In addition, the 
openness of the rulemaking process today compared to the 1960s, due in 
large part to the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Act, has made that 
process even more difficult.122 
That said, much has changed since the MDL statute was passed in 1968, 
and those changes may make it more likely that amendments or new federal 
rules will come to fruition.  Two examples come to mind.  First, the general 
climate of private enforcement is far more controversial now than it was five 
decades ago.123  As Professor Farhang has demonstrated, in the 1960s 
Congress made intentional choices to deploy private attorneys to enforce the 
substantive law through litigation.124  And Congress, led in large part by 
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Senator Joseph Tydings’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Improvements in 
Judicial Machinery and prodded by a legislatively active Judicial 
Conference,125 expanded the machinery of the federal courts in order to 
efficiently handle the coming litigation.126  The MDL statute was central to 
that ethos; indeed, one of the primary goals of the drafters of the statute was 
to ensure that the federal courts would be able to face the wave of coming 
litigation.127  In short, the solution to the “litigation explosion” the judges 
feared was more efficient judicial machinery.128  The ascendancy of this 
ethos was, however, short-lived.  Not long after the statute was passed, 
private enforcement became much more controversial.129  As Burbank and 
Farhang show, the goal of political conservatives was to squash litigation, 
not facilitate it.130  In retrospect then, the MDL statute may represent the 
high-water mark for zeal for procedural innovations to assist private 
enforcement.131  Today, even the use of the courts to enforce the substantive 
law is a source of major controversy,132 and, as the proposals for revising the 
MDL statute illustrate, litigation itself is seen by many as an evil to be 
avoided.  This view appears to be shared by Chief Justice Roberts and many 
of those he has chosen for the Rules Committees.133 
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Second, procedure itself has changed, as has the perception of it, at least 
among lawyers and scholars.  For one thing, as every reader of this 
Symposium surely knows, trial rates continue to drop to infinitesimal 
levels.134  As a result, despite the outsized importance of bellwether trials in 
MDL cases, there is no denying that all of the action occurs in pretrial 
proceedings.135  As a result, the notion that MDL is a mere technical device 
to ensure efficiency in discovery can no longer be maintained, though that 
was never an accurate description.136  In 1991, Professor Resnik once 
referred to the MDL statute as a “sleeper”—she was correct then, but not so 
now.137  This attention to MDL fits with the recognition that procedural law 
is powerful—both in terms of who writes it and what it says.138  Both the 
controversial process and the product of the recent discovery-rules 
amendments provide ample evidence that the world has changed.139  So 
while history would suggest that major changes to the MDL statute are not 
in the offing, perhaps those who are so aggressively pursuing change are 
actually striking at exactly the right moment. 
Setting current politics aside, one goal of this Article is to suggest that 
while much has changed, there are also aspects of the current moment that 
closely resemble the mid-1960s.  And, indeed, there may be some wisdom to 
be gleaned from the experience of the creation of the MDL statute that may 
prove useful going forward.  For instance, the rule makers may simply 
conclude that the insights of Becker, Murrah, and their colleagues in the 
1960s continue to persuade today.  Those judges understood that rigid rules 
would simply not do for a dynamic area of law.  They believed that MDLs 
would come in many shapes and sizes, and judges would need flexibility in 
order to manage them.  Strict rules would potentially hamstring judges in 
their ability to adapt to changing circumstances, new laws, and different 
kinds of litigation.  As a result, the judges eschewed rules and chose instead 
to collect wisdom in regularly revised versions of the Manual for Complex 
Litigation.140 
It is difficult to see how, if at all, changes in the last fifty years have 
undermined this essential insight.  As MDL has grown more prominent, 
particularly in the wake of obstacles to mass-tort class actions, numerous 
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massive controversies have found their way before transferee judges.  
Seemingly every major controversy of national scope, including massive 
consumer fraud, products liability, data breaches, and the gargantuan opioid 
epidemic, is now the subject of an MDL.141  Although the growth of MDL 
as the central mechanism for resolution of complex litigation in the federal 
courts is a primary reason it now attracts critical attention after lingering in 
the shadows for decades, the massive number of complicated cases that now 
find their way into MDL is a reason to retain flexibility rather than freeze 
procedure through a set of specific mandates. 
It may very well be true that some of the proposals found on the wish list 
of reform advocates would be worthwhile in certain kinds of cases.  For 
instance, at a certain point in products liability MDLs (a point much further 
down the road than sixty days), Lone Pine orders and case censuses may well 
be justified to ensure that only meritorious claims remain.142  And there 
certainly may emerge, after additional experimentation, best practices for 
selecting and conducting bellwether trials.143  But whether such practices are 
appropriate in a given case should remain within the discretion of the 
transferee judge, perhaps guided by a much-needed revision to the Manual 
for Complex Litigation or other sets of best practices that may develop over 
the coming years.  Any such best practices will hopefully, like any study by 
the Rules Committee, be informed by empirical data and the real-world 
experiences of judges, litigants, and lawyers in MDL. 
Indeed, wide participation in such a project is crucial.  As outlined above, 
such widespread participation was not a hallmark of the creation of the MDL 
statute.  The small number of plaintiffs’ lawyers that the judges consulted 
were happy to be on board because they recognized the potential benefits of 
aggregation.144  The defense lawyers, on the other hand, sought at first to 
slow the process down and later to amend the statute to make it more defense-
friendly.  The judges, for their part, viewed these counsel as rent seekers 
opposed to both enforcement of the law and the public interest.  As a result, 
the judges shut them out of the process and impugned their motives.  The 
lawyers, of course, did not take this lying down and managed to both engineer 
an ABA resolution opposing the statute and block it in Congress.  It was only 
after the judges and lawyers met face-to-face in New York, and the judges 
promised the lawyers a seat at the table for the drafting of the Manual, that 
the block dissipated and the statute passed. 
Half a century later, the parallels are apparent.  Once again, the lawyers of 
the corporate-defense bar are seeking to amend the MDL statute—and to 
dominate the process.  From their point of view, the flexibility and 
 
 141. Cabraser & Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 876. 
 142. D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2175, 2177 (2017); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Comments on the Fairness in Class Action 
Litigation Act of 2017, REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2017), http://static.reuters.com/resources/media 
/editorial/20170213/houseclassaction--burchletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSJ4-3KST]. 
 143. Alexandra D. Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 59 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 
2018). 
 144. Bradt, supra note 27, at 877. 
2018] BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF MDL 105 
unpredictability of MDL work against them—just as they thought the pre-
MDL informal aggregation of the electrical-equipment cases did.  The 
amendments they seek limit the discretion of the MDL judge and increase 
oversight.  The current proposals, especially FICALA, appear more like an 
opening bid for reform from the defense perspective than an evenhanded 
rethinking of current policy, and we do not know whether the claims 
supporting them stand up to empirical scrutiny.  The reforms suggested by 
groups like Lawyers for Civil Justice lead only to benefits for corporate 
defendants, so while they may open the bidding they should only serve to 
start the conversation.  Before making sweeping changes to the MDL 
process, we must study more closely how MDL works in practice—both in 
large and small litigations—and we must ensure that any proposed reforms 
are vigorously debated in light of what that study reveals.  My own view is 
that such debate would be best undertaken as part of a multiyear process of 
developing a revised Manual for Complex Litigation, but that is an argument 
for another day. 
So we end where we began.  The push for MDL reform remains about 
power and control.  Lawyers who perceive themselves as harmed by the 
control that the drafters intentionally lodged in the JPML and transferee 
judges want to wrest it back by restraining those judges with defense-friendly 
rules.  As Professors Burbank and Farhang have shown us, such success 
through legislation or rulemaking is likely a long shot.145  But their story, of 
course, does not end there.  The project of retrenchment succeeded in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, where rulings are final and five votes are all that is 
necessary.  While statutes and rules are sticky, the Court is the universal 
solvent.  By specifically not using the Federal Rules, lodging power in the 
JPML, and writing an open-ended statute, there is precious little in the MDL 
statute for the Supreme Court to retrench under the guise of interpretation.  
But there are nevertheless possibilities for the Court to cut back on MDL’s 
applicability.  For instance, I have argued that the basis for nationwide 
personal jurisdiction in MDL, at least as currently articulated, is surprisingly 
weak, though not unconstitutional.146  All told, the MDL statute is relatively 
difficult to undermine through interpretation—statutory or constitutional—
but one thing Burbank and Farhang have taught us is that the Supreme Court 
is extraordinarily powerful and ideologically polarized when it comes to 
private enforcement, so all bets may be off if MDL finds its way into the 
Court’s crosshairs.147 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its growth, prominence, and success, on its fiftieth anniversary the 
MDL statute faces a looming battle for control of its future.  Legislative and 
rule-based proposals abound, though prospects for their success are 
uncertain.  What is clear, however, is that the corporate-defense bar is eager 
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to impose procedural requirements on the operation of MDL cases, in order 
to rein in unpredictable and imperialistic judges and limit unmeritorious 
claims that flow into the MDL with little scrutiny.  If their proposed rules are 
adopted, it would mark a major change in the structure of MDL, which was 
designed to operate with no one-size-fits-all requirements, much less Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or congressionally mandated strictures.  This small 
group of federal judges believed that flexibility and independence on the part 
of the JPML and MDL transferee judges were necessary to cope with the 
onslaught of nationwide litigation headed for the federal courts.  Moreover, 
the MDL statute’s supporters believed they were acting in opposition to the 
members of the corporate-defense bar, whom they thought opposed the 
statute in order to both preserve litigation advantages related to costs and 
delays for their clients and to frustrate private enforcement of the substantive 
law. 
These two conclusions by the drafters—that rules would be 
counterproductive and that the defense bar was interested more in protecting 
their interests than in efficient administration of justice—led the drafters to 
design the MDL statute to be both insulated from rule makers and run with 
little interference.  That is, the locus of control of MDL was placed within 
the JPML and their handpicked MDL transferee judges.  It is that central 
feature of MDL that is now up for grabs.  Whether change is coming is 
uncertain.  At best, statutes are sticky and procedural change tends to be, in 
Professor Marcus’s words, evolutionary rather than revolutionary.148  But 
much has changed since the 1960s—MDL is having its moment in the 
spotlight, and those in favor of change show no signs of letting up.  As the 
process moves forward, it will be critical to both gather data and query 
whether the decisions that the drafters of the statute made a half century ago 
still have power.  Otherwise, the next fifty years of MDL may wind up 
looking very different from the first. 
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